Signed reports

An approved report always carries its signed manifest. The contract enforces it: approved without a signature is not verifiable evidence, and publishing it as if it were is worse than having no signature at all.

sequenceDiagram
    participant C as Cliente
    participant S as SBOX
    C->>S: GET /v1/reports/{id}
    S-->>C: 200 · signature { manifestId, algorithm: Ed25519, publicKeyId }
    C->>S: POST /v1/verify
    S-->>C: 200 · verified_ed25519_offline
    Note over C: o verificación offline con la clave pública publicada

curl -sS "$SBOX/v1/reports" -H "authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq '.data[] | select(.signature != null)'

Offline verification

The signature is Ed25519 over the canonicalized payload (json-stable-stringify-v1). No network, database or runtime needed: the published public key is enough. That is what keeps the report verifiable when Ucotron is not on the other side.

What breaks

A manifest with a corrupt key or signature returns "does not verify", not a 500. A 500 on hostile input confirms to the attacker that they reached the engine, and denies the honest integrator the only answer that helps them.

A tampered manifest returns 422 with invalid_ed25519_signature, even if the rest of the document is intact.

Endpoints in this guide

• GET/POST /v1/reports
• GET /v1/reports/{id}
• POST /v1/verify